EVM = Electronic Voting Machine
An Electronic Voting Machine is an electronic device used to record and count votes in elections.
The Indian system is known as the ECI-EVM, designed and used specifically for Indian elections under the procedures and rules prescribed by the Election Commission of India (ECI).
The present ECI-EVM system consists of:
Voter → Ballot Unit → Control Unit → VVPAT paper trail
The traditional paper-ballot system had several practical difficulties:
EVMs were introduced to make the voting and counting process more efficient and reduce invalid voting.
The ECI highlights advantages including quicker counting, elimination of invalid votes associated with paper ballots and reduced scope for mass bogus voting through the technical limitations of the system.
EVMs were first used in an election in the:
Parur Assembly Constituency, Kerala
Year: 1982
They were used in 50 polling stations during the election.
First use of EVM → Parur Assembly Constituency, Kerala → 1982
The first use of EVMs created a legal issue because the existing election law did not specifically provide for their use.
In A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai (1984), the Supreme Court held that EVMs could not be used in elections in the absence of specific legal provisions authorising their use.
Parliament subsequently inserted Section 61A into the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Section 61A provides the statutory basis for the use of voting machines in elections, subject to the conditions prescribed by the Election Commission.
1982 → First use
↓
1984 → A.C. Jose judgment
↓
1988 → Section 61A inserted in RPA 1951
↓
Legal framework for EVM use established
The ECI-EVM system has three principal components:
The Ballot Unit is the unit through which the voter records their choice.
It is placed inside the voting compartment.
The voter presses the button corresponding to the candidate of their choice.
The Control Unit is kept with the Presiding Officer or Polling Officer.
It controls the voting process and records the votes.
The polling official releases the ballot through the Control Unit, after which the voter can cast their vote on the Ballot Unit.
The Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail generates a paper slip corresponding to the vote cast.
The voter can visually verify the printed slip before it falls into the sealed VVPAT drop box.
The Ballot Unit is the component directly operated by the voter.
The voter does not operate the Control Unit.
BU → Voter
CU → Polling Official
The Control Unit is kept with the Presiding Officer/Polling Officer.
The ECI describes the Control Unit as the component through which the polling officer releases the ballot and controls the voting process.
Ballot Unit → voter side
Control Unit → polling official side
The elector's identity and eligibility are verified according to the prescribed procedure.
The polling official activates the voting process through the Control Unit.
The voter enters the voting compartment.
The voter presses the button corresponding to the chosen candidate on the Ballot Unit.
The vote is electronically recorded.
The VVPAT produces the corresponding paper slip.
The voter gets a brief opportunity to verify the printed information through the VVPAT viewing window.
The slip automatically falls into the sealed VVPAT drop box.
Identity verification
↓
Ballot released
↓
Voter presses candidate button
↓
Vote recorded in CU
↓
VVPAT slip generated
↓
Voter verifies
↓
Slip deposited in sealed box
VVPAT = Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail
It is an independent paper-trail system attached to the EVM.
When the voter casts a vote, the VVPAT slip contains information such as:
The slip remains visible through the viewing window for 7 seconds before it falls into the sealed drop box.
VVPAT was first used in the:
Noksen Assembly Constituency, Nagaland
Year: 2013
The legal framework for VVPAT was introduced in August 2013.
EVM → First used 1982, Parur, Kerala
VVPAT → First used 2013, Noksen, Nagaland
The ECI currently uses the M3 model of ECI-EVM and VVPAT.
M3 EVMs were introduced from 2013–14 and progressively replaced earlier models.
M3 EVMs are:
They are not connected to the internet during voting.
The ECI describes EVMs as stand-alone machines.
They are not connected to:
The ECI also states that the EVMs do not use a conventional operating system and employ security features designed to prevent subsequent reprogramming of the programmed microcontroller.
Statement: EVMs can be hacked remotely through the internet.
Incorrect in the context of ECI-EVM architecture.
ECI-EVMs are stand-alone, non-networked machines.
Indian EVMs are indigenously designed and manufactured.
They are manufactured by two Public Sector Undertakings:
Under the Ministry of Defence.
Under the Department of Atomic Energy.
The machines are developed under the guidance of the Technical Experts Committee (TEC) constituted by the Election Commission of India.
EVM manufacturers → BEL + ECIL
The Technical Experts Committee (TEC) provides technical expertise relating to EVMs and VVPATs.
Its role includes matters concerning:
The ECI's EVM system combines:
Technical safeguards + Administrative safeguards + Legal safeguards
FLC = First Level Checking
It is the process through which EVMs and VVPATs are physically and functionally checked before being deployed for an election.
Only machines that pass FLC are used.
Authorised engineers of:
conduct the checking under the supervision of the election administration.
Recognised political parties' representatives are permitted to participate/observe the process as prescribed.
EVMs undergo two levels of randomisation.
EVMs are allocated constituency/segment-wise.
This is done in the presence of representatives of recognised political parties.
After the candidate list is finalised, EVMs are allocated polling-station-wise.
The allocation is again shared with candidates/representatives as prescribed.
Two-level randomisation makes it difficult to know in advance which particular machine will be deployed at which polling station.
The ECI describes this as an important administrative safeguard.
Randomisation prevents predetermined machine-to-polling-station allocation.
Before an EVM is used in the actual poll, it undergoes the commissioning process.
This includes:
Candidates or their representatives are permitted to participate in the commissioning process and sign seals used for EVMs.
A mock poll is conducted to verify that the EVM and VVPAT are functioning correctly before actual voting.
On polling day, polling agents of contesting candidates are allowed to observe the mock poll.
The ECI's current procedures include higher mock polls on randomly selected EVMs during commissioning.
The selected machines are subjected to specified numbers of mock votes, and the electronic result is compared with the corresponding VVPAT slip count.
Candidates/their representatives are allowed participation according to the prescribed procedure.
Mock poll is not merely a demonstration.
It is an important verification and safeguard mechanism.
EVMs are sealed at different stages of the election process.
Sealing protects against:
Candidates/polling agents are allowed to participate in the sealing process and sign seals as prescribed.
EVMs are transported and stored under prescribed security procedures.
The ECI uses an EVM Management System (EMS) for management and control of EVM stock and movement.
EVM security involves two broad categories.
Include:
Include:
EVM security is not based on technology alone.
It is a combination of:
Technology + Procedures + Human oversight + Legal framework
Provides the statutory basis for the use of voting machines.
It empowers the Election Commission to specify the constituencies or parts thereof where voting machines may be used, subject to the law.
The detailed procedures concerning EVMs and VVPATs are also governed by the Conduct of Elections Rules.
Relates to the design of electronic voting machines.
It provides for:
EVM-based voting does not remove the principle of secret ballot.
The voter casts the vote inside the voting compartment.
The VVPAT viewing arrangement also incorporates measures intended to balance:
The ECI explains that the tinted VVPAT viewing window is designed so that the slip can be viewed by the voter while maintaining secrecy from others.
One important advantage of EVMs is that the system prevents many forms of invalid voting associated with paper ballots.
With paper ballots, an improperly marked ballot could be rejected.
With an EVM, the voter selects the candidate by pressing the designated button.
EVM substantially reduces invalid votes caused by improper marking of ballot papers.
The ECI identifies EVM-related technical and administrative safeguards as reducing the effectiveness of booth capturing.
The ECI notes that the EVM voting process restricts the rate at which votes can be cast, making mass bogus voting more difficult and providing security forces time to respond to attempted booth capture.
EVMs do not eliminate the need for:
They are one part of the overall election-security system.
After polling:
The EVM does not independently declare the political winner.
It records the votes.
The Returning Officer declares the result based on the legally prescribed counting and result process.
| Feature | EVM | VVPAT |
|---|---|---|
| Full form | Electronic Voting Machine | Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail |
| Main function | Records vote electronically | Provides paper trail |
| Operated by | Voter + polling official process | Automatically linked to vote |
| Main component | BU + CU | Printer + viewing window + sealed box |
| Purpose | Recording/counting | Verification/audit |
| First use | 1982 | 2013 |
| Location of first use | Parur, Kerala | Noksen, Nagaland |
| Feature | Ballot Unit | Control Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Used by | Voter | Polling official |
| Location | Voting compartment | With Presiding/Polling Officer |
| Main function | Allows candidate selection | Controls and records voting |
| Candidate buttons | Yes | No |
| Ballot release | No | Yes |
BU = Button Unit for voter
CU = Control Unit for official
| Feature | Paper Ballot | EVM |
|---|---|---|
| Recording | Paper | Electronic |
| Invalid votes | Possible due to improper marking | Greatly reduced |
| Counting | Manual | Electronic |
| Paper handling | High | Low |
| Counting speed | Relatively slower | Faster |
| VVPAT | Not applicable | Available |
| Storage | Ballot papers/boxes | EVM + VVPAT |
The voter selects the candidate through a designated button.
Electronic recording facilitates quicker counting.
Large-scale printing and handling of ballot papers is reduced.
EVMs are comparatively easier to transport and handle than large quantities of ballot material.
Stand-alone architecture and other technical safeguards reduce certain risks.
The paper trail adds an additional verification mechanism.
For UPSC, EVM-related concerns should be understood as issues debated in electoral administration, rather than simply accepting or rejecting one side.
Concerns include:
EVM debates should be examined through the framework of transparency, verifiability, secrecy, security, auditability and public confidence.
EVMs have been subjected to judicial scrutiny over several decades.
Important cases include:
The Supreme Court held that EVMs could not be used without an enabling legal provision.
This led to the subsequent statutory framework under Section 61A of the RPA, 1951.
The Supreme Court recognised the importance of introducing a paper trail to strengthen transparency in EVM-based voting, leading to the implementation of VVPAT.
These cases show the evolution:
EVM → Legal authorisation → VVPAT → Greater verifiability
Think of EVM security as a chain:
Manufacturing
↓
Testing
↓
First Level Checking
↓
First Randomisation
↓
Candidate Setting / Commissioning
↓
Second Randomisation
↓
Mock Poll
↓
Sealing
↓
Polling
↓
Secure Transportation
↓
Strong Room
↓
Counting
↓
VVPAT Verification
Security is maintained throughout the entire life cycle of the EVM.
EVM was first used in the 1990s.
❌ Incorrect.
It was first used in 1982.
EVM was first used in a Lok Sabha election.
❌ Incorrect.
The first use was in the Parur Assembly constituency by-election in Kerala.
VVPAT was introduced before EVM.
❌ Incorrect.
EVM → 1982
VVPAT → 2013
VVPAT replaces the EVM.
❌ Incorrect.
VVPAT is attached to the EVM system as a paper-trail mechanism.
EVMs are connected to the internet during elections.
❌ Incorrect.
ECI-EVMs are stand-alone and non-networked.
EVMs are imported machines.
❌ Incorrect.
They are indigenously designed and manufactured by BEL and ECIL.
Section 61A belongs to the Representation of the People Act, 1950.
❌ Incorrect.
Section 61A is in the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
VVPAT is only a display mechanism with no paper record.
❌ Incorrect.
It generates a paper slip that is deposited in a sealed drop box.
The voter operates the Control Unit.
❌ Incorrect.
The voter operates the Ballot Unit.
The Control Unit is with the polling official.
Randomisation occurs only after polling.
❌ Incorrect.
EVMs undergo two levels of randomisation before deployment.
Consider the following statements:
Which of the statements given above are correct?
Answer: 1 and 3 only
Consider the following statements:
Answer: 1 and 3 only
Consider the following statements:
Answer: 1 and 2 only
Consider the following statements:
Answer: 1 and 3 only
Consider the following statements about VVPAT:
Answer: 1 and 2 only
| EVM Element | Function |
|---|---|
| Ballot Unit | Voter selects candidate |
| Control Unit | Controls and records voting |
| VVPAT | Provides paper trail |
| First Level Checking | Checks poll-worthiness |
| Randomisation | Prevents predetermined deployment |
BU → Voter selection
CU → Control/recording
VVPAT → Paper trail
FLC → Functional checking
Randomisation → Deployment security
| Topic | Key Fact |
|---|---|
| EVM | Electronic recording and counting |
| First use | Parur, Kerala, 1982 |
| BU | Operated by voter |
| CU | Operated by polling official |
| VVPAT | Paper verification trail |
| First VVPAT use | Noksen, Nagaland, 2013 |
| Current model | M3 |
| Architecture | Stand-alone, non-networked |
| Manufacturers | BEL and ECIL |
| Legal provision | Section 61A, RPA 1951 |
| FLC | First Level Checking |
| Randomisation | Two levels |
| Mock poll | Verification before actual polling |
| Sealing | Protects custody |
| Strong room | Secure storage |
| VVPAT slip visibility | Approximately 7 seconds |
| Important case | A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai |
| VVPAT case | Subramanian Swamy v. ECI |
EVM
→ Electronic Voting Machine
→ First used 1982
→ Parur, Kerala
→ BU + CU + VVPAT
→ Present model M3
→ Stand-alone + non-networked
→ Manufactured by BEL + ECIL
→ Legal basis: Section 61A, RPA 1951
→ VVPAT first used 2013, Noksen, Nagaland
→ Security: FLC + Randomisation + Mock Poll + Sealing + Strong Room + VVPAT
Ballot Unit
→ Voter operates it.
Control Unit
→ Polling official operates it.
VVPAT
→ Provides paper trail.
EVM
→ Electronic voting/recording system.
FLC
→ Checks machines before deployment.
Randomisation
→ Determines deployment without predetermined allocation.
Mock Poll
→ Tests functioning before actual voting.
EVM security is a system, not merely a machine.
The integrity of EVM-based elections depends upon:
Technical design
Legal authorisation
First Level Checking
Randomisation
Mock Poll
Sealing
Secure Custody
VVPAT
Counting and verification procedures
The evolution of EVMs in India can be understood as:
Paper Ballot
↓
Need for faster and cleaner voting
↓
EVM introduced
↓
Legal challenge
↓
Section 61A, RPA 1951
↓
Greater use of EVMs
↓
Demand for paper verification
↓
VVPAT introduced
↓
Technical + Administrative + Legal safeguards
EVM is not simply an electronic replacement for a ballot paper. It is part of an integrated electoral process involving electronic recording, voter verification, technical safeguards, administrative controls, legal provisions and judicial scrutiny.
